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Malaysia does not seem to follow the conventional pattern of a larger 
power that uses stronger military force to gain a better security posture. Instead, 
Malaysia has chosen to adopt the more encompassing approach that defines 
national security as “the capacity of the society to protect individuals, groups and 
the nation from physical and socio-economic danger”. Given this approach, 
which is almost anthropological in nature, Malaysia has been able to promote a 
form of national ideology acceptable to all communities, and has thereby 
provided a common basis for achieving and maintaining peace and harmony. A 
stringent internal security law was re-enacted to sustain this peace in 1969, as 
well as to curb any threat from future insurgents and terrorists. In addition, the 
government created a development and security plan known as KESBAN in 1979 
to win the hearts and minds of the population and launched massive border 
operations with Thailand in 1974 until 1978 to block the egress and exit routes of 
communists. As a result of such efforts the Malaysian government’s overall 
containment policy was successful and the Malaysian government managed to 
secure the communists’ surrender in December 1989. In addition to examining 
the success of the British and Malaysia in the Malayan Emergencies this thesis 
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Guerrilla warfare, particularly in its early stages, is extremely resistant to 
conventional military force because the massed systems that dominate 
mainstream operations cannot engage the guerrilla force. Indeed, even if 
collateral damage was not an issue, and it almost always is, the mass 
annihilation or deportation of a population does not, in itself, guarantee the 
elimination of the guerilla force. So long as a single survivor knows the location of 
the weapons caches, the guerrilla movement can readily revive itself. 
Therefore, in modern military thinking, a second, parallel military structure 
has emerged: counterinsurgency forces. Operating under various names, 
counterinsurgency troops try to overcome the lack of surgical precision of 
conventional forces. More importantly, such forces typically organize operations 
designed to drive a wedge between the guerrillas and the population. This is the 
main concern of this thesis. The problems of counter-terrorism seem striking. 
How do we pinpoint the enemy in order to destroy enemy forces and their 
capabilities?  
The present US strategy for combating terrorism relies very much on the 
concept of the battle of ideas. But such efforts are likely to be far easier with 
consideration of the kind of anthropological factors that can strike deep at the 
heart of the people. It is the contention of this thesis that counterinsurgency and 
counter-terrorism efforts can be successful only if military strategy is blended with 
consideration of anthropological factors to win public support and earn the 




































"Guerilla warfare is the war of the weak against the strong... 
Guerilla war cannot bring final victory". 
General Nasution – Indonesia 
A. BACKGROUND 
The aftermath of World War II left the world a number of legacies and a 
series of minor wars. Although these were little wars, they were still big enough 
to the men who had to fight them. One of the first of these wars was against the 
Communists in Malaya. The success of the communists in China in the late 
1940's had boosted the morale of communists worldwide and the domino effect 
was felt in Malaya as well.1  
Malaya in the 1940's was a country that consisted of four-fifths jungle. 
Most of this jungle was primary forest, land that had never been cleared for use. 
Huge trees blocked out most of the sunlight in these coastal forests and swamps. 
Because of the density of the trees visibility was cut, in places, to only a few 
yards. The armed wing of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) took advantage 
of this terrain and utilized it as their area of operation. MCP felt that it was time to 
overthrow the 'Capitalist and Imperialist' government and so began to wage war 
by means of insurgency against first the British Government and later the 
Malaysian government.  
In 1947 the MCP had 12,590 members and was divided into 10 regiments, 
spread throughout the Malayan peninsula. MCP began its armed resistance 
against the government in 1948. The 1st Malayan Emergency was declared by 
Britain in 1948 in response to the insurgent movement launched by the MCP, 
whose guerrilla forces were labeled Communist Terrorists (CT).  
After initial setbacks, the British adapted a wide range of civil-military 
initiatives, including the Briggs Plan, which involved a massive resettlement of 
                                            
1 My Far East: The Emergency 1948-1960. Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.myfareast.org/Malaysia/emergency.html. 
2 
thousands of people from jungle areas where they were vulnerable to guerrilla 
intimidation to the relative security of new villages. Britain also prepared the local 
people for independence, which was granted in August 1957 when Malaya 
became Malaysia. By 1960, the 1st Emergency was practically over and, indeed, 
the Malaysian government declared the end of the Emergency in July, 1960. The 
remnants of the once formidable communist forces remained mostly in secluded 
areas near the border with Thailand.2 
 
Table 1.   Map of Malayan Peninsula during period of Malayan Emergencies. 
                                            
2 Jay Gordon Simpson, Not by Bombs Alone: Lessons from Malaya, Joint Force Quarterly Summer 1999 (No.22). 
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/sum99.htm. 
3 
A multi-racial country such as Malaysia is fragile and is built along ethnic 
lines that do not map on to class distinctions. The one unfortunate racial clash-in 
particular that of May 13, 1969-was used by remnants of the CPM along the 
Malaysia/Thailand border to revive their effort to take over the government. This 
gave rise to what was later known as the 2nd Malayan Emergency. The 
communists once again became active and started to indoctrinate the people at 
all levels, from government officials to trade unionists, to include the armed 
forces, police, and members of the middle class. At the same time, the 
communists were promoting their communist ideology, their goal was to cripple 
the government and create political instability by rendering the economy a 
shambles. They sought to achieve this via a popular uprising as well as through 
armed struggle. The communist party’s main targets were the middle and lower 
classes living in remote and rural areas. In many respects, this was no different 
from what communists were trying to achieve elsewhere. However, Malaysia’s 
response was distinct from that of other countries experiencing communist 
insurgencies. 
From its inception, Malaysia chose not to follow the conventional pattern 
of a larger power that uses stronger military force to gain a better security 
posture. Instead, the Malaysian government adopted the more advanced, 
encompassing, and holistic approach that defines national security as “the 
capacity of the society to protect individuals, groups and the nation from physical 
and socio- economic danger.”  
Given this approach, which is almost anthropological in nature, the 
Malaysian authorities have been able to promote a form of national ideology 
acceptable to all communities, and have thereby provided a common basis for 
achieving and maintaining peace and harmony. A stringent internal security law 
was also enacted in 1969 to sustain this peace, as well as to curb any threat from 
future insurgents and terrorists. In addition, the government created a 
development and security plan known as KESBAN to win the hearts and minds 
of the population and launched massive border operations with Thailand to block 
the entry and exit routes of communists. As a result of such efforts the Malaysian 
4 
government’s overall containment policy proved successful and the Malaysian 
government managed to secure the communists’ surrender in December 1989.3 
What it took to reach this point is what this thesis hopes to reveal.  
In support of these arguments this paper draws inspiration from the words 
of the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad when he told 40 
journalists attending the East Asia Economic Summit, that “removing Iraq's 
President Saddam Hussein from power and bringing democracy to Iraq would 
not solve problems affecting that country, nor tackle international terrorism 
effectively. He said President Bush was taking the wrong approach in fighting 
terrorism because Americans were angered by the Sept. 11 attacks, and angry 
people usually do not think rationally. Fighting terrorism requires rooting out its 
causes, he said, and in Malaysia's historical experience of combating terrorist 
insurgency, citizens who feel they have a stake in the country, eventually 
abandon their fight”.4  
 
B. HYPOTHESES 
The following are my hypotheses: 
1. The surrender of the Malaysian Communists in 1989 to the 
Malaysian government was due to the fact that the government planners 
understood the direct effect of including what I call anthropological factors 
into their overall strategy. 
2. The counterinsurgency warfare (CIW) model still being used by the 
British and other countries needs to take into more explicit consideration 
various anthropological factors, in order to be able to sustain operations 
given current trends in the changing nature of insurgent threats. 
                                            
3 The Washington Post, Rebels End Insurgency in Malaysia; Communists Accept Peace after 41 Years: [FINAL 
Edition], Washington, D.C (Dec 3, 1989), 33. 
4 Gail G. Billington,  Malaysia's Mahathir: Back to Production, Dump Globalization October 18, 2002 issue of 
Executive Intelligence Review. Retrieved May 20, 2004 from 
http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2002/2940_mahathir.html. 
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3. Internal security law is one of the key factors that made a difference 
in Malaysia among formerly communist sympathizers and supporters. 
4. Bilateral agreements and understandings reached with neighboring 
countries must be emphasized to block external interference and support 
from reaching the insurgents. 
 
C. AREA OF RESEARCH 
This thesis intends to study the success of the British and Malaysian 
governments in combating insurgency during the 1st and 2nd Malayan 
Emergencies. The purpose of the study is to examine how the Malaysian model 
of counterinsurgency, plus appropriate consideration of domestic anthropological 
factors, can yield a feasible model to be used in future counterinsurgency 
warfare. The thesis will discuss the historical background and method of 
operation of the Malayan Communist Party, the planning concept and execution 
of counterinsurgency undertaken by first the British and then the Malaysian 
governments, and social analysis of the Malaysian population during and after 
these Emergencies. The thesis will also draw some lessons for the War on 
Terrorism based on the Malaysian experience in handling subversive activities. 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The first part of this thesis will provide an overview of the main players in 
the conflict in Malaysia. The discussion will describe both sides’ organization, 
areas of operation, techniques, and operational plans. These observations will be 
based on material gathered from primary and secondary sources. As well I will 
draw on some participant-observation and personal experiences. The purpose of 
this discussion is to identify the various anthropological factors that were used by 
the players to achieve their strategic objectives. This discussion will be the 
subject of Chapter II.  
Chapter III will then analyze the usefulness of such anthropological factors 
in shaping the success or failure of the overall operations. This chapter will draw 
6 
on opinions and views expressed in interviews with participants. Differences in 
local environments will be highlighted to identify the suitability of the various 
anthropological factors for counterinsurgency warfare and counter-terrorism. 
In Chapter IV I will identify and compare models that were used in 
Vietnam with those applied in Malaysia in order to highlight similarities as well as 
differences. In conclusion, the thesis will re-examine the hypothesis and 
determine whether the proposed model is suitable for use in future 
counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism efforts outside Malaysia. 
 
E. RELEVANCY 
Although conventional warfare remains the basic structure for how we 
model modern war, the present threat that the United States discovered in Iraq, 
and the Soviet Union discovered in Afghanistan suggest a change in focus is 
long overdue, particularly among strategic thinkers. The huge force structure 
needed in the conventional setting is not particularly effective against guerrilla 
forces. 
Guerrilla warfare, particularly in its early stages, is extremely resistant to 
the successful application of conventional military force because the massed 
systems that dominate mainstream operations cannot engage the guerrilla 
forces. Indeed, even if collateral damage was not an issue, and it almost always 
is, the mass annihilation or deportation of a population does not, in itself, 
guarantee the elimination of the guerilla force. So long as a single survivor knows 
the location of weapons caches, the guerrilla movement can readily revive itself. 
Therefore, in modern military thinking, a second, parallel military structure 
has emerged: counterinsurgency forces. Operating under various names, 
counterinsurgency troops try to overcome the lack of surgical precision of 
conventional forces. More importantly, such forces need to organize operations 
designed to drive a wedge between the guerrillas and population. This is the 
main concern of this thesis. The problems of counter-terrorism seem particularly 
7 
striking. How do we separate the insurgent from the population and pin point the 
enemy in order to destroy his forces?  
The present US strategy for combating terrorism relies very much on the 
concept of the battle of ideas. But such efforts are likely to be far easier with the 
full utilization of anthropological factors that strike deep at the heart of the people. 
It is the contention of this thesis that counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism 
can be successful only if military strategy is blended with consideration of 
anthropological factors to win public support and earn the public’s cooperation in 
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II. PLANNING AND EXECUTION 
“Revolutionaries are like fish that swim in the water of people; 
defeating insurgents is then a matter of separating the fish 
from the water” 
Mao 
A. MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY 
Taken together, the Malayan Emergencies comprise an intense 41 year 
guerrilla war fought by the British, British Commonwealth, and Malaysian forces 
against the armed wing of the MCP led by Ching Peng. A strong believer in 
communism, Ching Peng who took over command of MCP from Lai Teck (the 
founder and first leader of MCP) in 1947 was ideologically confident of victory 
and claimed that armed struggle was the only way forward for the Chinese in 
Malaya.5 The external encouragement and support that he gained further 
strengthened his assertion about achieving control over Malaya and, in 1948, 
insurgent activities intensified against the British government of Malaya. 
Historically, communist activity started when the influence of communism 
in China was brought into Malaya by the Chinese immigrants who came to work 
in the tin mining industry in the 19th century. This new ethnic group distrusted the 
government. Also, Chinese racial attitudes clearly set them apart from the 
indigenous Malay who comprised the main ethnic group in Malaya  and whom the 
British favored.6 The Chinese also brought with them their Chinese traditional of 
informal associations that provided group security to Chinese in mainland China 
and elsewhere.7 We could say the MCP, which was established in the late 
1930’s, borrowed heavily from the secret society model. 
This new party targeted the Chinese and sought to serve as their 
protector. Because the MCP’s attempt to influence the other races failed it 
continued to be dominated by the Chinese throughout both Emergencies. Not 
                                            
5 Ibid., 27. 
6 Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lesson from Malaya and Vietnam (Greenwood 
Press, 1993), 60. 
7 Milne, Malaysia: Tradition, Modernity, and Islam. (Westview Press, 1986), 15 - 20. 
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only did the MCP operate as a political movement, but it claimed to offer the 
Chinese people their only hope in the political arena. If they submitted, the MCP 
would strive to protect the Chinese interests as well as create an avenue for 
participation in political matters in the overall administration of Malaya. By 1934, 
not only had branches of the party been established in all the states on the 
peninsula of Malaya, but its membership (including members of affiliated 
organizations) had grown to 12,716.8  
What, we might wonder, were the motivating factors that would have 
attracted the Chinese to associate in such large numbers and so rapidly with the 
MCP? There may be other answers to this question, but the separation between 
Chinese and Malay communities, together with apparent culture differences in 
language, religion and practices provide the likeliest answer.9 These differences 
helped convince the Chinese that a communist state could offer them a better 
way of life than could the British government. Such attitudes and views made 
many Chinese sympathetic to the promises of the MCP, especially since they 
also felt that they, as Chinese, were superior to the Malays, and that communism 
was a superior form of government, as proven by mainland China.10  
The already antagonistic relationship between the Chinese and the 
indigenous Malays deteriorated further in the aftermath of WW II, a situation that 
provided an atmosphere particularly favorable to insurgent activities.11 The action 
taken by the British to establish the Malayan Union immediately after WWII 
annoyed the MCP which felt it should be given priority over the Malays in the 
administration of Malaya. Acknowledging that a communist state would not be a 
possibility once the British government proposed the Malayan Union in 1946, the 
MCP decided to agitate in the Chinese communities. It also reactivated and in 
1949 renamed its armed wing, which was formally known as the MPAJA, as the 
                                            
8 Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An analysis of The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954. (Westview Press, 1992), 
9. 
9 Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lesson from Malaya and Vietnam.(Greenwood 
Press, 1993), 60. 
10 Luvcien Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya. (Priceton University Press, 1956), 207. 
11 Stubbs, Richard 1989.Hearts and minds in guerrilla warfare: the Malayan emergency, 1948-1960, Singapore. 
(New York: Oxford University Press), 46. 
11 
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA).12 This armed wing which was 
supported by the British during WW II played a major role in the efforts to evict 
the Japanese from Malaya. Legally, the armed wing was disbanded by the British 
when it took over the administration of Malaya after the Japanese surrender. 
However, the abiding legacies of the MPAJA’s participation in WWII held 
important consequences for the MCP’s future. 
The fact that a large quantity of arms and ammunition had been provided 
by the British to the MPAJA during WW II for fighting the Japanese helped make 
an armed insurrection possible. By July 1948 the MCP was unveiling its plan to 
oppose the Malayan government openly and, on July 23rd, the Malayan 
Government responded by declaring the MCP an unlawful society.13 Despite this 
declaration, the MCP claimed to be nationalists fighting ‘to rid the British 
imperialists and their lackeys, especially the group of feudalists and other running 
dogs headed by the Malay Sultans’.14 The objective was to replace the present 
government with a new Malayan People’s (Chinese) Republic.  
In fighting for their cause, the MCP invoked a protracted three-phase 
campaign strategy. The three phases, following Mao Tse Tung’s successful 
model, were a terror campaign to be conducted by raiding and killing European 
planters, tin miners, high ranking government servant and police officers; 
destabilization of the government by depriving it of effective control, thus 
undermining the confidence of the population and their faith in their colonial 
rulers and the Malaysian Government; seizure of villages and towns in order to 
turn them “into liberated areas” and thus encircle bigger towns, leaving the 
federal capital of Kuala Lumpur for the final assault.15  
Apart from the above strategy, the MCP relied heavily on the Chinese 
communities which comprised one third of the total population at the outset of the 
insurgency to provide support. The use of Min Yuen, otherwise known as the                                             
12 Ibid., 87. 
13 The Virgin Soldiers: Malayan Communist Party 1948-1960, retrieved  21/6/2004 from http://www.britains-
smallwars.com/malaya/mcp.html#smm4.   
14 Barber, Noel. The War of the Running Dogs – The Malayan Emergency: 1948 – 1960.(Weybright and 
Talley,1972).  
15 John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: an analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954.(Westview Press, 
1992),51. 
12 
People’s Movement, consisting of Chinese who largely resided in the Chinese 
squatter villages or along the jungle fringe, was significant in the overall struggle. 
They provided intelligence as well as logistical support to the main insurgents 
whose bases were mostly deep in the jungle.  The British estimated in 1952 that 
active working members of the Min Yuen numbered about 11,000 (of whom 
3,500 to 4,000 were armed), while active insurgents numbered about 12,000.16 
Because, too, the Chinese had always been passionate about education, 
particularly members of the coolie class who viewed education as the key to 
escaping their poverty, the MCP found itself with a golden opportunity to 
indoctrinate youth with their Maoist ideology. They considered school to be a 
source of recruits for the party and they started building schools.17 Having found 
themselves able to take advantage of the Chinese desire for education, it should 
not then be surprising that almost the entire rank and file of the MRLA, as well as 
the Min Yuen, could be characterized as formerly uneducated Chinese.  
The MCP in its attempt to expand its influence in Malaya also sought to 
persuade the aboriginal tribes to join it. Learning from its WW II experience, the 
MCP took advantage of employing aboriginal tribes or ‘Orang Asli’, as an 
intelligence screen and provisioning agency against the British. For this purpose, 
a special organization was set up, called the ‘asal’ (a Malay word meaning 
‘original’ or aboriginal).18 The MCP forces, with crucial assistance from the 
aboriginal tribes, easily slipped away from the British whenever they engaged in 
large-scale search and destroy type operations. The British did not know about 
the asal until late 1953.19 The aboriginal tribes were continuously used by the 
MRLA during the Malayan Emergencies.20  
In summary, the Chinese were alienated from the British colonial 
government and even more so from the Malayan community. Their primary anger 
                                            
16 Komer, R. The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, 
Santa Monica, California. (RAND, 1972), 8. 
17 Mackay, The Malayan Emergency 1948-60: The Domino That Stood. (Brassey’s (UK) Ltd., 1997), 21. 
18 Carey, Orang Asli: The Aboriginal Tribes of Peninsular Malaysia. (Oxford University Press,1976), 310. 
19 Roy Davis, Death waits in the Dark: The Senoi Praaq, Malaysia’s Killer Elite. (Greenwood Press, 2001), 40. 
20 Mackay, The Malayan Emergency 1948-60: The Domino That Stood, (Brassey’s (UK) Ltd., 1997), 11. 
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was directed at the Malay community. Later, a number of Chinese began to feel 
that communism offered a way to change the British-Malay system.21 
  
B. THE BRITISH PLAN  
The British Army in Malaya at this time consisted of 11 battalions of 
British, Gurkha, and Malay troops. The number of guerrillas bearing arms 
outnumbered the actual fighting men of the British Army as most battalions were 
under strength.22 The Army's first task was to conduct a holding operation, 
keeping the guerrillas on the move by constant searching, patrolling and 
ambushing.  
The main problem faced by the British was that throughout the country 
there were some 600,000 squatters who lived on the fringes of the jungle on land 
to which they had no real title or right. The guerrillas used these settlements as a 
refuge and to store food.23 As Mao pointed out, the insurgent needs the support 
of the population as the fish needs water.  Due to this situation, the government 
decided to uproot and resettle these squatters in ‘New Villages’ where they could 
be isolated from the guerrillas. In these villages they were able to build their own 
houses and receive farmland that was to be legally theirs. This is the famous 
‘Briggs Plan’ that was first introduced in Malaya by General Briggs who was 
appointed as the Director of Operation Malaya in 1950.24 
By the end of 1951, more than two-thirds of the squatters were living in 
509 New Villages. The plan proceeded well and assisted in the effort to reduce 
communist influence.25 The communists were thus cut off from their usual food 
supplies and were forced to move into the jungle areas. At the same time, a 
reward system was set up whereby persons giving information leading to the 
capture of communist insurgents were awarded cash bounties. This led many                                             
21 Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lesson from Malaya and Vietnam. (Greenwood 
Press, 1993), 61. 
22 Mackay, The Malayan Emergency 1948-60: The Domino That Stood. (Brassey’s (UK) Ltd., 1997), 36. 
23 Onwar.con (December, 16,2000). The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, retrieved 11/ 3/ 2003, from 
http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/mike/malaya1948.htm. 
24 John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: an analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954.(Westview Press, 
1992),82. 
25 Barber, Noel. The War of the Running Dogs – The Malayan Emergency: 1948 – 1960.(Weybright and 
Talley,1972),  99. 
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communist insurgents who surrendered to then offer information about their 
former comrades’ activities and, with this intelligence, the guerrillas’ tactics as 
well as their movements were known.26  
Throughout the Emergency the Government maintained a policy of 
policing villages rather than destroying them, and of "winning the hearts and 
minds" of the people. Winning the hearts and minds of the people was deemed 
so important that the government had to change its military strategy and tactics. 
For instance, extensive use of the Air Force in aerial bombing and strategic 
bombing was prohibited to avoid collateral damage that could affect the civilians. 
The new roles of the Air Force in guerrilla warfare became air reconnaissance; 
dropping of supplies to Army units operating in jungles; evacuating casualties; 
and providing mobility for the Security Forces with helicopters which were used 
very effectively to move troops from one point to another when searching out and 
subsequently attacking suspected camps.27 
The normal tactic of search and destroy was used widely but with some 
modification. Unlike the American policy in Vietnam where soldiers would come 
and go in conducting search and destroy operation,  the British and Malaysian 
soldiers played the guerillas’ game by living out in the jungle for weeks in order to 
ambushing them. The general population felt secure from MCP threats thanks to 
the regular and semi-permanent presence of the government troops. By 1953 
these tactics had succeeded in forcing Chin Peng, the leader of the MCP during 
the Emergency, to move his headquarters into Thailand. He had not been able to 
establish any liberated areas, and by the end of 1958 there were only 250 
guerrillas operating in Malaya. 
On 31 August 1957 the Federation of Malaya became an independent 
country within the Commonwealth and by 31 July 1960 the ‘Emergency’ was 
officially over and all emergency restrictions were lifted except in the immediate 
area of the Thai border where remnants of the MCP lived in the remote regions 
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of the jungle.28 The table below indicates the chronological events of the 1st 
Malayan Emergency. 
 
YEAR      EVENTS 
 
1930  - The establishment of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). 
1943  - British support the establishment of MPAJA. 
1945  - British take over the administration of Malaya after WWII. 
   The British disband the MPAJA and legalized the MCP. 
1946  - Malayan Union. 
1947  - MCP reactivates MPAJA. 
1948  - The declaration of the 1st Malayan Emergency. 
   MCP is declared illegal. 
1949  - MPAJA is renamed MRLA 
1950/1952  Implementation of the Briggs Plan – Chinese New Village. 
   The enforcement of Hearts and Minds Program under Templer. 
   The formalization and expansion of the Home Guards. 
   The establishment of combined intelligence in the Police Special  
   Branch. 
1953   MCP headquarters moves to the border of Thailand. 
1957   Malaya received independence. 
1960   The declaration of the end of then 1st Emergency. 
Table 2.   Chronological Events of the 1st Malayan Emergency. 
 
C. MALAYSIAN FOLLOW-UP PLAN 
The official declaration of the end of the Emergency in 1960 signaled that 
the communist threat was physically finished. Nonetheless, the task of combating 
the remnants of the MCP was far from over. The shift in objectives from armed 
struggle to promoting communist ideology by the MCP complicates the situation. 
Indeed, propaganda designed to undermine the Constitution that, as established, 
provided special status and political privileges to the Malays, began to shake the 
newly independent state of Malaysia.29 From 1960 to 1969, the MCP who 
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the Army, DA Pam 550-45), 104. 
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operated from the secluded areas of the Malaysian/Thai border rebuilt their 
strength to the point where it was thought that Chin Peng was able to regroup as 
many as 2,000 guerrillas. Quietly, the MCP sent out ‘Shock Brigades’, which 
were small units that moved south, down the peninsula, attempting not only to 
pick off isolated police posts and Security Forces jungle patrols, but also to 
rekindle support for the MCP via propaganda.30   
The economic problems during the immediate post-independence era 
made some of the Chinese New Villages and the Chinese community at large 
susceptible to the propaganda and threats of the communist ‘Shock Brigades’. It 
should be obvious by the events of the following days that the most basic 
agreement between the races in the pre-independence era had been fraught with 
bad faith and misunderstanding just beneath the surface all along due to the 
different values in traditional practices. With the total withdrawal of the British 
military in 1967, the MCP took advantage of the situation to reorganize its armed 
struggle and instigated the Chinese to riot in 1969. The black day of May 13 
marks the beginning of the 2nd Malayan Emergency.31 
The mass amok which took place in Kuala Lumpur, the capital city of 
Malaysia, and a few other states after the general election in 1969, escalated into 
a fatal racial riot. The insults and abuse hurled at the Malays by unruly 
Opposition activists and sympathizers (mostly Chinese) who, for the last few 
years had been inspired by the communist propaganda and the underground 
movement, try to take control of the country. As a result, there was massive 
fighting and slathering between the Malays and Chinese which led to the 
declaration of a state of emergency by the government.32  
The Malaysian Government acted promptly in facing the new Emergency 
by reintroducing counterinsurgency measures that proved effective during the 
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Emergency years.33 The immediate response was the creation of the National 
Operation Council which later became the National Security Council (NSC) under 
the Prime Minister's department that was established in 1969 with the 
responsibility of coordinating policies relating to the security of the country and 
the overall direction of security matters. This security structure was extended to 
the state, district and village levels and was meant to be coordinated with 
development efforts already in place.34  
In this respect, the late Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussian, the Prime Minister 
who was also the Minister of Defense, said, ‘the primary task of armed forces is 
to fight the communists, but at the same time they must also help implement the 
government development plan. This is part of the fight against communists. 
Defense and development go hand in hand’.35 The NSC further developed this 
concept into what is known as ‘Keselamatan dan Pembangunan’ (KESBAN is an 
acronym for security and development in Malay), and this concept was expanded 
to include strategy and policy in the broadest senses. 
KESBAN’s approach was based on the understanding and assumption 
that all humans aspire to having a full life. With the incorporation of this into its 
strategy, the NSC focused on several factors, to include physical security, a 
stable environment, group membership, social and economic justice, and 
individual achievement. Basically, to counter the communists the government 
adopted two programs, one of internal security and another of internal 
development.36 To guarantee internal security the government maximized the 
employment of the police and provided additional powers to the military to also 
conduct police operations by revising the Internal Security Act of 1960.37 The 
objectives   of   this   program   were   to   collect   intelligence   and   to   conduct  
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psychological warfare (psywar) in order to allow the security forces to launch 
tactical operations against the communists without causing unnecessary 
casualties to the population.   
In contrast, internal development was carried out by other government 
agencies in areas where the communists used to maneuver. The security forces 
were employed in these areas to ensure security and at the same time protect 
the populace and resources. The Government created infrastructure in the form 
of highways, schools, hospitals, and dams or hydroelectric plants. Rural areas 
were subsequently further developed by the government through the 
establishment and upgrading of agricultural productivity schemes such as the 
Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), Federal Land Consolidation and 
Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA), and Rubber Industry Smallholders 
Development Authority (RISDA) (these were all government sponsored rubber 
and palm oil plantations).38  
Although the establishment of all these schemes might seem to be 
economic in nature, they actually represented a double-edged weapon which 
enhanced economic activities as well as helped create a buffer zone between the 
communist insurgents and the Chinese New Villages. The implementation of 
these schemes involved the extensive relocation of Malay communities and, as 
such, created a hurdle for communications between the communists and their 
supporters.  
The counter-measures advocated through KESBAN were not developed 
in a short period. The strategy was protracted and therefore was able to alienate 
the insurgents from the populace while instilling confidence and winning the 
hearts and minds of the Chinese, as well as the indigenous people who mostly 
lived in the remote and isolated jungle areas.39 The government was concerned 
about the exploitation of the indigenous people by the communists and 
intelligently created community centers and progressively employed locals as 
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deep jungle special forces (known as the Senoi Praaq) under the police.40 The 
whole government effort bore fruits, and after 20 years of hard work the 
communists surrendered to the Government of Malaysia in 1989. Chronology of 
events in the Malaysian 2nd Emergency is shown in Table 3 below. 
YEAR     Events 
1969  - Race riot of May, 13. 
  - Declaration of the 2nd Malayan Emergency. 
  - Establishment of the National Operation Council (NOC). 
  - Revision of the Internal Security Council. 
1971  - Reorganization of NOC to NSC. 
1974/1975 - 1st combined operation with Thailand. 
1977/1978 - 2nd combined operation with Thailand. 
1979  - The implementation of the KESBAN Strategy. 
1989  - MCP surrenders, and the end of the 2nd Malaysian Emergency is  
   declared. 
Table 3.   Chronology of Events of the 2nd Malayan Emergency. 
 
In summary, almost all the programs under the counterinsurgency strategy 
implemented by the British and the Malaysians achieved great success. These 
programs were able to attract the Chinese to support the government and at the 
same time reject the influence of communism. Meanwhile, the security forces 
organized ‘Operation Kota’ along the border to block the ingress and exit routes 
of the communists. Although it took 41 years, together the Malayan Emergencies 
represent not only one of the first victories in a counterinsurgency struggle but 
they also helped dissolve the communist organization. What made the programs 
in this part of Asia so successful is the subject of the next chapter.  
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III. ANTHROPOLOGICAL FACTORS 
“While we fight against the known or suspected terrorists we 
must eliminate the causes” 
Mahathir Mohammad 
A. ROOT CAUSES OF THE MALAYAN EMERGENCIES 
Is it true that we can exert no power to save ourselves from the humiliation 
and oppression inflicted upon us by a much smaller insurgent or terrorist force?  
There must be a way. And we can only find a way if we stop to think, to assess 
our weaknesses and our strengths, to plan, to strategize and then to counter-
attack. This was what the British and later the Malaysians did. While they fought 
against known and suspected terrorists they also eliminated the causes.  
What were the causes of the Malayan Emergencies? The argument that 
the Malayan Emergencies were the result of a difference in ideology actually 
came later. The primary problem in Malaya, as communism took root, was the 
deep division between the major races or, in other words, inherent serious 
potential for ethnic conflict.  Each of the major races was ethnocentric and did not 
share common views.41 There are many reasons why these divisions existed, 
and among the most prominent are: 
1. Newcomer, New Society 
Although the Chinese has been trading in the region since the earliest 
times, most of the large-scale Chinese settlements were not established until 
much later in the peninsula’s history.  In the later wave of immigrants, between 
the years 1870 to 1920, when the Chinese and the Indians came in droves to the 
region in search of economic opportunity, assimilation did not take place. 
Instead, new immigrants came in with sufficient numbers to form their own 
communities in the tin mines and the rubber plantations and thereby were able to 
maintain their culture and practices. Each of the communities was very different 
in nature. They spoke different languages, viewed the world differently, and 
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practiced different religions. With social separations like these, integration 
between the races was not easy after WW II.  
2. British Divide and Rule 
The “divide and rule” policy of the British was dominated by economic 
motives and the idea that it was easier to manage a divided rather than unified 
group of people.  Racial stereotyping was practiced. The British educated the 
majority of the upper class Malays to be officers of the Government and ignored 
the other ethnicities’ development. Ordinary Malays were considered to be 
farmers and fisherman with their vernacular education tailored for such humble 
tasks.  In the towns and cities, the Chinese dominated in terms of population, and 
were under the purview of a separate branch of government with their own 
education system. Due to their business acumen, they managed to prosper 
economically.   The Indians, on the other hand, were the subjects of the rubber 
estates on which they labored. 
3. Separate Political Practices 
The multi-ethnic society in Malaya had been molded into standard form by 
different ethnicities working in different jobs. The cleavages in society were 
aggravated after the British administration encouraged the different communities 
to organize communally, but also isolated them from one another culturally and 
politically. Malaya’s early political development can thus be said to have been 
characterized by a lack of integration. When the British re-took power after WW 
II, they intended to overcome the problem of racial discrimination through the 
Malayan Union. By then, however, the racial division had become too 
entrenched.42 
 
B. APPEALS TO EMOTION  
Although Malaysia is a country that is an ‘extreme pluralistic society with 
clear divisions of race, language and religion’, the Malays and other indigenous 
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people saw themselves as the real rulers and owners of the land.43 Most Chinese 
and Indians came as migrants during the period of British colonial rule. Thus, the 
Malays expected certain privileges and rights in what they regarded as their 
country. The proposal of a Malayan Union in 1946 by the British and the racial 
clash of May 13th, 1969, instigated by the MCP, hindered the efforts for racial 
integration and did much to prevent national unity and stability.44  
The middle class Chinese communities were closely associated with the 
communist terrorists as they felt alienated and were not given the rights to own 
land by the ruling British Administration before the country achieved its 
independence. The majority of the Chinese who formed the CPM support bases 
tried to convince the rest of the Chinese that races other than Malay were 
`second class citizens’ thanks to the British bias in favor of the Malays. The 
situation became worse when the Reid Commission (Commission set up in May, 
1956 to formulate the Malaysian Constitution)45 proposed to introduce the 
Constitutional provision making Islam the national religion and the Malay 
language the main language.46 This especially angered the Chinese who felt that 
they deserved more due to their overwhelming control of the Malaysian economy 
and their role in ousting the Japanese.47  The Chinese failed to realize that the 
Constitution conferred on them citizenship that would protect their properties and 
make them eligible to vote, and thereby have a voice in the government that 
could allow them to demand power sharing. 
Given the sensitivity of various races and religions coupled with cultural 
and socio-economic differences, it was easy to inflame the population. Once 
antagonistic feelings had been stoked, it only took a spark to ignite armed 
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conflict.48 The situation became complicated given the prevailing political, 
economic, and social problems in the aftermath of World War II and during the 
early post-independence years. The communist leadership that sought to take 
the lead in the proposed independent state of Malaysia refused to accept a multi-
racial government recommended by the British. They formulated propaganda so 
that the people would hate the government by saying that the Chinese would not 
get their rightful share should they support the proposed government led by the 
Malays. Any programs that involved the Malays were rejected by the Chinese 
and hence made it difficult for the British to move forward. These were the major 
causes of the overall Malayan Emergencies that ended after only 41 years of 
hard struggle and suffering.    
 
C. REASON FOR THE SUCCESS  
The campaign in Malaya can be seen as a tactical success, but some 
have argued that it was a strategic failure for the British. Although the MCP was 
defeated, British rule had to be abandoned and independence was granted to 
Malaysia. Regardless, could the Malaysian experience provide a model or a 
theory for counterinsurgency? How did the British and later the Malaysian 
governments overcome the ill feeling of the Chinese and use an understanding, 
even if only implicit, of anthropological factors to effectively execute their overall 
strategy? 
Based on his experiences in Malaya, Sir Robert Thompson offers six 
essential principles for how to succeed in counterinsurgency warfare.49 First, the 
government must have clear political aims, for example a free, stable, united 
country. Second, the government must function in accordance with the law. Only 
by doing so can the government preserve its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. 
Third, the government must have an overall plan for coordinating civil and military 
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efforts. Fourth, the priority should be to defeat political subversion, not the 
guerillas themselves. Fifth, after military operations have been conducted in a 
specific area, civic action programs must be initiated. Finally, the government 
must have already secured its base areas first. By working outwards from their 
secure areas, government forces are more likely to have some morale-boosting 
successes early on.  
The British actions in Malaya largely illustrate Thompson’s principles for 
counterinsurgency. The underlying factor was that the British understood the 
people. The British authorities at the highest level gave priority to hearts and 
minds programs. The local people at first had little real idea of what the fighting 
was all about, but the hearts and minds campaign of General Templer changed 
all that. He first gained the whole-hearted support of the Malays, who had 
become more than a trifle suspicious of the British who seemed to want to 
establish a government that would include the Chinese as equal partners after 
the end of World War II.50 The British gained the trust of the Malays only after 
they promised independence to Malaya with the Malay Sultan designated to be 
the Head of State and Malay rights to be enshrined in the Constitution.  
The British promise of eventual independence meant that the people of 
Malaya felt a legitimate sense of responsibility for safeguarding Malaya from the 
Communists, especially the Malays who viewed the Communists with suspicion 
as they were mostly Chinese. With Independence and the new Constitution, 
Malay interests and rights were safeguarded and Malays were committed to 
protecting them. Important positions in the government were also given to Malay 
nationalists which was another indicator that they would subsequently take over 
the overall administration of Malaya. Select young Malay leaders and their 
children were sent to England for tertiary education and this, too, indirectly 
quelled people’s suspicions and secured their trust.  
At the same time, the fence-sitting Chinese who feared for themselves 
and their families were also gradually won over. The granting of land titles to the 
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Chinese who basically used government land to cultivate vegetables was a major 
factor in the campaign to win their hearts and minds. In doing this, the 
government managed to change the perception of many Chinese who believed 
that the government was biased towards the Malays and would never allow the 
Chinese to hold any title to land. The government was likewise able to gain the 
trust of many Chinese people by ensuring that the ‘Briggs’ relocation program 
would not hinder Chinese economic activity. The government provided the 
Chinese who were involved in the relocation program with three pieces of land 
for a house, cultivation and a fruit farm.51  
The government further enhanced their efforts to win the support of the 
Chinese by recruiting more Chinese to be in the ‘Police Special Branch’, and 
stationed them in the New Chinese Villages.52 The employment of the Chinese 
as police demonstrated that the government was putting trust in the Chinese 
people to serve in the government, which was initially monopolized by the 
Malays. The Chinese village people felt more comfortable working with Chinese 
police than with Malays and, therefore, were very effective in acting as the eyes 
and ears for the government regarding communist activities. 
The establishment of the Home Guards to maintain local security for the 
‘Briggs Plan’ new villages offered an additional avenue by which the government 
could gain Chinese support. The Home Guards concept, which required the local 
population to organize its own security with financial and technical support from 
the government, created an environment of trust. A sufficient number of arms 
were given to the Home Guards to ensure the effectiveness of the scheme, 
stunning the Chinese who couldn’t imagine that the government would ever be 
willing to entrust them with firearms, especially given the significant number of 
communist supporters within the Chinese population.53  This had a tremendous 
positive impact among the Chinese, as far as judging the sincerity of the 
government in implementing a program for their betterment. 
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Education was a vital element in the life of all New Villages. The Chinese 
valued education and the overwhelmingly Chinese population of the New 
Villages placed a high priority on setting up Chinese language schools. The 
British government took advantage of this fact and started to offer more funds to 
facilitate proper Chinese schools. Not only was the government able to win 
Chinese support this way but, government-sponsored schools limited the 
influence communist propaganda could have among the younger Chinese 
generation. This double edged strategy managed to reduce the number of Min 
Yuen, as well as the cadre of the hard-core communists. 
While much of the hearts and minds programs were concentrated at the 
local level, and especially in the ‘New Villages’, there were other issues 
connected to policy matters. One of the most important questions concerned the 
right to be citizens of Malaya. Prior to the introduction of the citizenship law in 
1952, the Chinese had to apply for citizenship, and there were multiple 
requirements that were difficult to fulfill. With the new law, all Chinese born in 
Malaya automatically became citizen. This gave the Chinese people in villages 
and towns a sense of pride and belonging, and loyalty to the government.54   
One of the other important requirements that the British took into account 
during the Malaya Emergency was intelligence. Getting reliable intelligence is 
difficult in unconventional wars and for this reason the British established the 
Special Branch. The Special Branch was responsible for providing necessary 
intelligence to the Army and, hence, was the focal point for intelligence activities 
in the Federation. Because of their continuous presence in the village, members 
of the Special Branch gained the confidence and cooperation of the people who 
provided significant information about the location of MCP branches that 
controlled communist insurgents’ activities around and within several villages.  
In the case of aborigines who supported the communists, the British did 
not resettle them, knowing that they could never accept resettlement given their 
traditional culture. Instead, the British constructed a series of ‘forts’ to which the 
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aborigines could come and go as they pleased. The idea was for the forts to 
provide medical services and supplies to attract the aborigines, and at the same 
time to provide protection to those who were being dominated and coerced by 
the communists. In the later years the Malaysian Government continued to win 
over the aborigines when it gave them the opportunity to serve in the Special 
Senoi Praaq Forces, and form part and parcel of the Malaysian Police Force.55   
Winning the trust, and then engaging the aborigines, who were intimates 
of Malaysia’s forbidding canopy jungle, offered a huge advantage in detecting 
and monitoring the activity and movement of the communists. Aborigine 
assistance proved essential in the suppression of the communist combatants, 
and at a crucial point in the 1st Emergency more communists came to a violent 
end at their hands than those of any other security forces unit.56 The pioneering 
members of this group were trained by the British SAS in combat skills. This, 
combined with their expertise in jungle tracking and jungle maneuvers, created a 
formidable asset.  
The role of the police in ensuring the success of the British in tackling the 
problem of aborigines should not be overlooked. The importance of their role was 
substantiated by Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Najmi Mustaffa who 
personally was involved as one of the leaders of the aborigines’ paramilitary 
troop during the Emergency. The police were able to neutralize almost two 
platoons of aborigine communist insurgents and turn them into police trackers 
and informers, who then helped the government further penetrate the aborigine 
communities and combat the communists. As DSP Najmi has put it, “you have 
got to be with them and understand their culture in order to be able to penetrate 
their community and be accepted as allies.”57  
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D. HOW THE MALAYSIANS DID IT?  
The British model of counterinsurgency was improved during the 2nd 
Emergency by the Malaysian government. Where others failed, the Malaysians 
succeeded because they pursued a new strategy in security and development – 
KESBAN which entailed imposing an internal security law and conducting 
bilateral agreements with neighboring countries (in this case, Thailand) to ensure 
mutual support for combating communism.  
KESBAN also introduced a new economic policy, later called the New 
Development Policy (NDP), aimed at correcting imbalances among communities, 
while the armed forces were tasked to play a role in ensuring the security of 
these development programs. The whole idea of NDP was that the national 
economy pie should grow and the respective shares of all communities should be 
increasingly equalized. The secret of Malaysia’s success was explained by Dr. 
Mahathir bin Mohammad (Malaysia’s former Prime Minister who was the main 
proponent of KESBAN) in his famous quotation, "it is better to share a pie than to 
have all of no pie."58 
With the various government programs that focused on anthropological 
factors, the prospering immigrant communities (especially the Chinese) began to 
realize that disparities could ruin their good life and that the government 
generated a situation that has far better than that promised by the communists. 
In deed, they did finally agree to affirmative action and special privileges for the 
Malays and indigenous people, and understood that the government’s goal was 
not to be biased on behalf of any particular race or ethnic group, but rather to 
create a balanced community. The government assured non-Malays that 
restructuring   via   economic   development would   occur   through   sustained  
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economic growth, not through redistribution of existing resources, so that no 
particular group would experience any loss or feel any sense of deprivation in the 
process.59 
This affirmative action was drafted in a manner designed to not be too 
radical so it would be accepted. Although the Malay language was made the 
national language, the other races were allowed to continue to use their mother 
tongues for communication. Similarly, when Islam was announced as the state 
religion, non-Muslims were permitted full freedom to practice their own religions. 
The government believed that the way to defeat the communist insurgency was 
by power sharing and has, ever since, been a government consisting of 
moderate nationalist Malays and their Chinese and Indian counterparts.60 They 
have collectively managed the country by power sharing and have agreed that 
the execution of KESBAN has assisted the government in the overall strategy to 
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Figure 1.   KESBAN Model 
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As the model indicates, Malaysia has adopted a strategy that places a 
special emphasis on a containment concept with the idea of combating the 
communist insurgents without losing the confidence of the minority ethnic groups. 
The communist insurgents were cut off from their supporters and supplies by 
surrounding the Chinese New Villages with various development programs, such 
as FELDA, FELCRA and RISDA (introduced by the government as part of 
KESBAN strategy).  
Concurrently, the armed forces continued to cut off the routes used by the 
communists near the Thai border through ‘Operation KOTA’, and maintained a 
‘Maginot Line’ of defense along the East- West highway that stretches parallel to 
the border. A bilateral understanding with Thailand, and the execution of 
combined operations such as the ‘Daoyai Musnah’ and ‘Selamat Sawadee’, 
assisted in the objective of cutting off external support to the communists. 
Cooperation with Malaysia’s neighbor to block the inflow and outflow of insurgent 
support and activities did not end after the completion of the operations. A 
permanent understanding on bilateral cooperation in terms of intelligence and 
data collection continued to be developed through the form of a joint committee   
called the Regional Border Committee (RBC). This committee assisted in getting 
the communists to surrender.61 
Like the British before them, the Malaysian Government also allowed the 
Chinese to continue to maintain their own domestic security in the form of Home 
Guards. In doing this, it is clear the Malaysian government understood that, given 
their culture, the Chinese needed their own organization to provide security. The 
government provided the necessary support and did not forget to ensure direct 
control over the Home Guards. What we can see from this is that securing the 
trust of the Chinese overrode all other factors in winning their hearts and minds.62  
From another standpoint, the Chinese felt that the government was being 
fair by also moving the Malays into the new government projects of FELDA, 
FELCRA and RISDA and this, therefore, erased their feeling of being second                                             
61 The Malaysian Army's battle against communist insurgency in Peninsula Malaysia,1968-1989 / [editor-in-
chief, Sharom bin Hashim]. (Army Headquarters, 2001), 161-168. 
62 Lim Cheng Leng, The Story of Psy-Warrior, Tan Sri C.C. Too. (Interpress Printers Sdn. Bhd., 2000), 226. 
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class citizens (when they were asked to move from their homes to the New 
Villages). The army at the same time was tasked to ensure security in two 
separate projects. Their primary task was to operate as a security element to 
deny the communists support or supplies from the various villages, or even to be 
able to influence people with their communist ideology. Second, the Army’s task 
was to assist the civil authorities to clear the area of communist booby traps, and 
to provide security while the civil authorities ran the development programs within 
the area.  
These are the kind of KESBAN operations that took place especially in 
areas where New Villages were constructed and along the area bordering 
Thailand. The program was able to demonstrate the government’s seriousness in 
combating communism and also indicate the ability of the government to ensure 
security to the people who resided far from developed areas. Once the program 
ensured the people’s security, it allowed the government to create and expand 
communist free zones known as white areas.63 
As far as the communist insurgents themselves were concerned, the 
Malaysian government had created a hopeless war. The government kept up its 
propaganda that said that what the communist leadership advocated was wrong: 
‘The Chinese were not second class citizens’. In fact, the government gave 
special attention to them and made them part of the Malaysian community. The 
proof came in the form of concerted efforts to develop the so-called ‘black areas,’ 
or the jungle fringe.  
The huge plantation programs, the new highway, the electrical power 
plant, and the prosperous New Villages with all the basic necessities such as 
water, electricity, schools, roads and other infrastructural support speak for 
themselves. The psywar was tremendous in that the insurgents could not avoid 
                                            
63 Colonel William R. Stevenson, the Commandant of the Malaysian Army Management Institute, agreed and 
pointed out that the KESBAN strategy was successful especially when the government proved that there was no 
‘hidden agenda’ in the execution of the strategy except that it was the government intent all along to ensure that the 
Chinese and the Malays were to be united and create a better way of life. Colonel Stevenson was directly involved in 
the KESBAN program, especially in the East-West Highway project. His involvement include the clearance of booby 
traps along the highway and the building the security post in civil authority development areas. My personal interview   
with Colonel Stevenson was held on Sep 14, 2004. 
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being influenced.64 Furthermore, the hardship that the communists faced living in 
the jungle with the constant harassment by the security forces and shortages of 
supplies as a result of government efforts, forced them to think twice.      
Conceptually, the model above, together with the focus and emphasis on 
anthropological factors (especially those which relate to ethnicity, social class 
and culture), indicate that Malaysia rejected the Western idea of the 
homogeneous nation-state, instead accepting the multi-colored mosaic of its 
communities. These are not three, but rather thirty-three. The Chinese form 
many communities with various languages, cultures, and religions. Cantonese, 
Swatow, Hakka, Hokkien are as distinct as Sicilians and Swedes. Indians are 
equally diverse: Muslim and Hindu, Punjabis, Tamils, Bengalis. The native 
Malays also form various tribes and ethnic units. The oldest inhabitants of the 
Peninsula, the Orang Asli or aborigines, are Negroid people akin to Australian 
aborigines and Indian Dravidic people, and still roam the jungles, while 
Europeans and their descendents (of mostly mixed marriages) live in Malacca, 
Penang, and Kuala Lumpur.  
Malaysia rejected the idea of the 'melting pot' in the sense that 
communities have not been asked to integrate and assimilate.65 Rather, all 
Malaysians are encouraged to keep their identity and may attend schools where 
instruction is in their native languages while still adhering to the same overall 
curriculum as that mandated by the National education system. But nor has 
Malaysia fallen into the trap of multiculturalism either. The uncomfortable part of 
multiculturalism as preached by Westerners is the removal of the backbone of 
the nation: the rejection of the original religion and culture of the majority.  
This has not occurred in Malaysia. There is a state religion and a state 
language, and at the same time tolerance towards minorities. Sensitivity towards 
the various ethnic groups is guarded through the implementation of a stringent                                             
64 This view was concurred by Colonel Razali Ahmad during the interview at Malaysian Defense College on Sep 
15, 2004. Colonel Razali was personally involved in the execution of the KESBAN especially in the psywar and 
experience fighting the communist terrorists for over 10 years.  
65 "The Melting Pot" is a concept coined in America which relates to the promise that all immigrants can be 
transformed into Americans, a new alloy forged in a crucible of democracy, freedom and civic responsibility. Retrieved 
on Jan 10, 2004 from Washingtonpost. Com, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longterm/meltingpot/melt0222.htm. 
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internal security law. Within the purview of this law, the government has the 
authority to arrest and place a person in police custody when there is sufficient 
evidence to suspect that the person is on the verge of stirring up trouble related 
to issues of race or religion.66  
Most importantly, Malaysia has rejected Neo-Liberalism. Malaysians do 
not want to sell assets to the highest bidder, nor thereby impoverish people and/ 
or create a new class of super-rich. Food and housing were made inexpensive 
and often subsidized during the Emergency years. Malaysia is not a socialist 
country and during the Emergencies the leadership understood the importance of 
building a strong middle class, and hence identified a strategy that is based on 
the Second Sage of Confucianism: that is, to recognize the obligation of rulers to 
provide for the common people. As a result, the gap between the rich and the 
poor was reduced and there developed a large number of middle class people 
who rejected communism and supported the government.67    
In a nutshell, Malaysia has utilized a model that does not focus heavily on 
the use of force, but rather on a strategy of understanding the strength of such 
anthropological factors as race, social class, and culture, and has taken 
advantage of this together with judicious use of security forces to achieve a win-
win situation and resolve the communist threat in its totality. The surrender of the 
communist insurgents to the Malaysian government in 1989 is the real evidence 





                                            
66 Internal Security Act 1960: An Act to provide for the internal security of Malaysia, preventive detention, the 
prevention of subversion, the suppression of organized violence against persons and property in specified areas of 
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67 Israel Shamir, The Malaysian Solution. Retrieved on Sep 30, 2004 from 
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IV. COMPARE AND CONTRAST MODEL 
Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.  
Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)  
A. VIETNAM – AN ANALYSIS 
The Malayan experience has long been studied as a successful 
counterinsurgency, with the US, for instance, adopting similar programs in 
Vietnam, but with less success.68 Why was that? This chapter intends to analyze 
the situation in Vietnam and compare it to the Malayan Emergencies in order to 
question whether the US used the wrong model or whether other factors were 
responsible for the negative results in Vietnam. 
The Strategic Hamlet program was applied by the US and the South 
Vietnamese government (GVN) early during the Vietnam War. The initial concept 
came from Sir Robert Thompson, who was at that point of time the head of the 
advisory team from Britain. Based on his experiences in Malaya, Thompson 
outlined a plan and suggested to the GVN that the main government target 
should not be simply the destruction of Viet Cong (VC) forces, but rather to offer 
an attractive and constructive alternative to communist appeals.  
The idea of Strategic Hamlets was almost an imitation of the experience of 
the British in its New Village program conducted under the ‘Briggs Plan’ in 
Malaya during the 1st Emergency. The plan involved pacification of the 
countryside by conducting a resettlement of the population. The government then 
used trained civic action teams to assist peasants to establish their own security 
by constructing fortifications around their village and by establishing a local 
defense unit. This was to be followed by government-instituted social and 
economic programs within the hamlet.69 The hamlet was to be incorporated into a 
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communications system linking it to the province chief and military units that 
could be dispatched to the hamlet in case of need.70 
From Thompson’s perspective, this could only be accomplished by 
emphasizing national reconstruction and development in the populated rural 
areas. It was his opinion that the program would require extensive and stringent 
security measures, but that these measures required primarily police rather than 
regular military forces. It was proven in Malaya that the police could better 
establish close rapport with the populace. On the other hand, the army was 
useful for keeping the VC off balance by mobile action and therefore could serve 
to prevent insurgent attacks in the limited areas in which the GVN would 
concentrate its initial pacification efforts.71  
When he presented his proposal, Thompson indicated that such a 
program offered considerable potential because it should lead by stages to a 
reorganization of the government machinery for directing and coordinating all 
actions against the communists. The program would also lead to an overall 
strategic plan for the country as a whole, and would be able to define 
responsibilities, tasks, and priorities. Subsequently, this would lead to the 
establishment of a permanent security framework which could be developed 
eventually into a National Police force and an intelligence organization for the 
direction and coordination of all intelligence activities against the communists. 
Thompson’s proposal was agreed upon and executed in mid-February 
1962. However, relocations under the Strategic Hamlet program caused cultural 
distress and economic misery. Villagers were not adequately compensated and 
the system was riddled with corruption. Social projects were undermined by VC 
activity and it was not long before villages were re-infiltrated. The main short 
coming was that the implementation of the Strategic Hamlet program did not take 
into account the human factors it should have. Since the VC were not isolated, 
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one result was that the free fire zone areas that were supposed to ensure 
security were counter-productive.72  
It was hard for the US to reverse these failures, not because the theory 
was wrong, but rather because it faced a multi-dimensional problem in Vietnam. 
In fact, from the very beginning, Thompson’s plan was criticized by US advisors 
since according to the US, the recommendations did not look to quick action, 
emphasized the wrong area, were designed to emphasize the wrong operational 
agency, and proposed unacceptable command lines.73 
A detailed scrutiny of the Strategic Hamlet program reveals external 
problems rather than problems inherent to the model itself. The plan started with 
opposition from the US advisors concerning the place, the size, the command, 
and the pace with which the program was to be implemented. The US advisors 
were worried about VC reinforcements from North Vietnam and wanted a 
strategic plan that would emphasize this rather than the Strategic Hamlet 
program’s aim to gain local support in order to stop the inflow of communists. 
Meanwhile, those in the GVN who wanted the Strategic Hamlet program 
forced it through with tremendous urgency. Province chiefs were ordered to 
establish a given number of hamlets by a given date, which they did. Often in 
doing so, however, they failed to provide the people with adequate alternative 
means of earning money, leaving them in locations too far from their work and 
markets with inadequate transportation. Inhabitants of the hamlets were not 
properly registered, nor were they adequately protected by police from terror 
within or guarded from external attack.74 
The situation became worse by 1963. The GVN neglected the 
anthropological factors, especially those relating to religion. The government 
                                            
72 Ibid., 13-17. A specific strategy by which the U.S. and GVN would attempt to end the insurgency in South 
Vietnam had never been agreed upon at the time that the U.S. decided, late in 1961, to increase materially its assistance 
to GVN and to expand its advisory effort into one which would implement a "limited partnership." By early 1962, 
however, there was apparent consensus among the principal participants that the Strategic Hamlet Program, as it came 
to be called, represented the unifying concept for a strategy designed to pacify rural Vietnam (the Viet Cong's chosen 
battleground) and to develop support among the peasants for the central government.  
73 Ibid., 19. 
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Special Forces arrested Buddhist monks and attacked pagodas. The method 
taken by the GVN to solve the communist problem caused political crisis, 
Buddhist uprisings and other unrest that brought the overthrow of President 
Diem’s government. This spelled the end of the Strategic Hamlet program as 
well. Indeed, we could say the program failed even before it was able to take off.  
Only the military portions of the program received adequate attention, and the 
civic action that was needed as a follow-up was ignored totally by GVN. The 
Diem government never really achieved widespread support among the people 
because its program failed to consider or appreciate the sensitivity of people to 
their economic, social, and spiritual well-being, never mind just their physical 
security. 
 
B. COMPARE AND CONTRAST 
The insurgency in South Vietnam reached a crisis at the end of 1963, in 
many ways parallel to the crisis in Malaya at the end of 1951. In both cases, the 
war took a new turn, whereas this was for the better in Malaya, and for the worse 
in South Vietnam. Both places executed a large scale resettlement of the 
population, whereas only in Malaysia did the government devise a positive 
campaign to ensure security of the New Villages.  
As a consequence, in Malaya there was a decline in the number of 
communist insurgents and their activities, while in South Vietnam violence 
escalated faster than ever before. This led to massive reinforcements by 
insurgents from North Vietnam. The campaign in Malaya, as shown in Figure 2, 
was very systematic and could be clearly seen by the population at large as a 
positive plan, and one that was producing demonstrable successes while in 
Vietnam the government only managed to implement part of its program.  
It is not to be denied that a detailed comparison of the situation in Malaya 
and Vietnam would reveal numerous differences. But the fact that in both 
situations the background approach of the insurgents was similar and that 
otherwise, all countries have religion, social structure, and culture were dominant 
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in many of the same ways in both countries makes them worthy of comparison.75 
The counterinsurgency model in Malaya as shown below can be divided into two 
layered programs. In the first layer, efforts are geared more towards the 
formation of a plan and strategy for the whole nation. Based on the overall 
concept, the second layer (shaded in Figure 2) will then emerge. This is the 
stage where the government has to take anthropological factors into account 
because the execution of this layer deals directly with the population at large. 
 








































“While we fight 
against the known 
or suspected 
terrorists we must 
eliminate the causes”
“Revolutionaries are
like fish that swim in the 
water of people; defeating 
insurgents is then a 
matter of separating the 
fish from the water”
 
Figure 2.   Counterinsurgency Model in Malaya. 
 
In Malaya, Templer was very careful when conducting programs with 
Malays and with Chinese. The Malays are very sensitive about anything involving 
their religion while the Chinese are sensitive about their society. Hence, the 
Briggs plan, the hearts and minds program, and the emergency law were 
executed taking account of the different sensitivities of these races, and as a 
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result those programs gained support from both these main groups in Malaya. 
This was one of the main reasons why the British were successful in Malaya. 
In contrast, the GVN only focused on the first layer in devising its Strategic 
Hamlet program. The plan and the strategy were drawn very neatly, but when it 
came to execution the whole thing crumbled. The sensitivity of the population 
was not given priority as the program was conducted. The executors wanted to 
introduce strategic hamlets without taking into consideration or reacting to the 
population’s concerns.  
The Buddhist monks and pagodas were very important to the Vietnamese.  
Had the GVN exploited these elements, it could have gained the support of the 
people. Monks could have been used as the middle men to secure the trust of 
the people and problems could have been more easily solved through the good 
offices of the monks. This did not happen because the government failed to 
recognize the importance of such factors. Furthermore, the small elite at the top 
that was close to the government administrators was primarily composed of 
Catholics and refugees from the north, while the peasantry in the south was 
Buddhist.76  
The above factors had both a direct and indirect effect on other problems 
in Vietnam related to the execution of the Strategic Hamlet program. There was 
no security within the hamlets and people refused to become policemen because 
they did not trust the ruling government. In this kind of a war, the internal security 
of inhabited areas must have priority over defense against outside attacks. At the 
very least, internal security is a prerequisite. Foreign troops can relieve the army 
in the jungle, but the village policemen must be Vietnamese to be effective. The 
government failed to win the hearts and minds of the people and failed to 
encourage them to join the police force or even to form a formidable paramilitary 
to ensure security.  
All in all, it was the failure of the government’s modus operandi rather than 
the model that was ineffective. The Vietnamese were more comfortable with the 
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Viet Cong than the government. In such circumstances failure is more likely to 
occur than success. Failure to gain the people’s support will result in the enemy 
gaining a bigger advantage. The only way forward is to have a good strategy by 
which to earn the support of the people. This can only happen if the government 
understands the factors that tend to be anthropological in nature that influence 
people’s behavior. If not, instead of one political, economic and military war being 
fought against the enemy, there will be separate wars in all these fields multiplied 
by the administrative and military divisions within the country.77 
                                            

























You only have power over people so long as you don't take 
everything away from them. But when you've robbed a man of 
everything he's no longer in your power--he's free again.  
Alexander Solzhenitsyn 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL FACTORS IN 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Insurgency or ‘people’s war’ refers to conflicts that mainly rely on local 
populations and external support to survive.78 In formulating counterinsurgency 
strategy the concept must be to gain control over the people and project a shield 
to prevent external intervention in order to ensure that the insurgents can not 
survive. Hence, counterinsurgency revolves around the fact that the central issue 
in achieving success is securing the loyalty and commitment of the population at 
large for the government’s cause. From this it follows that counterinsurgency 
operations should create among the population as few additional or gratuitous 
reasons as possible for supporting the insurgents.  
What, then, would be the best way to win over the people’s support? 
Looking back into the cases of Malaya and Vietnam, anthropological factors such 
as race, religion, culture, and social class seem to be some of the factors that 
must be understood and utilized in any approaches to gain the people’s trust and 
support. Failing to do so will likely result in complications and even disasters. In 
Malaya, the military forces tailored their operations to the kind of war they faced 
rather than to the kind of fighting they had been trained and organized to carry 
out. Military operations were controlled through the National Security Council on 
which the military had representatives, while the military command structure was 
limited to assuring supply, training, replacements, and similar needs.79 
Military action alone is unlikely to be effective in securing the support of 
the people. A comprehensive strategy which includes social, economic and 
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political dimensions needs to be formulated. One of the key problems in 
designing preventive counterinsurgency measures has been that we do not know 
which kinds of economic, social, and political action are the most effective in 
building national unity and in reducing vulnerability to insurgent appeal. Based on 
the case study of British and Malaysian success in Malaya, it seems clear that 
those counterinsurgency models which take into account anthropological factors 
are more likely to succeed.  
In Malaysia, tension mounted between the two main ethnic groups, the 
Malays and the Chinese, resulting in widespread rioting, killings, and the 
revitalization of the insurgent movement. The government evaluated the racial 
tension and understood it should take a more anthropological approach in 
handling these issues, though it didn’t put its approach in these terms. The 
government adopted a hearts and minds program to overcome this tension while 
imposing a straight emergency law to curb communist subversion. With this 
strategy, the Malays who felt that Malays are the real residents of Malaya were 
given independence and control over the new government while the Chinese 
were given citizenship. A clear appreciation for the underlying social structure, 
with the creation of Chinese New Villages and the Chinese being granted the 
freedom to play a role in their own security in the form of Home Guards, took into 
account the nature of Chinese political culture and behavior, and was actually an 
anthropologically informed means of sustaining support. 
During the 2nd Emergency, the Government of Malaysia took the 
communist insurrection seriously and set the stage for easing tensions among 
the various races and denying support to the communists by increasing 
economic opportunities through a strategy outlined in the New Economic Plan 
(NEP) of 1969 and subsequently through the implementation of KESBAN in 
1970. Concurrently, the government weakened the insurgents’ activities and 
influence by developing black zones and filling these areas with agricultural 
activities run by Malays who were anti-communist. Apart from separating the 
communists from their supporters, focusing on agricultural development also 
45 
helped reduce divisions between the peasants and the wealthy, and help 
moderate the problem of societal cleavages.  
The government’s ability to learn from mistakes and not repeat errors 
contributed to the effort of fighting the insurgents. Being a multi-racial and multi-
religious society, Malaysia has taken a moderate approach in its Islamic 
practices and cultural policy.  There is no attempt to brand members of 'other 
religious groups' as the 'enemy' (doing so is strictly proscribed under the law), 
and religions co-exist peacefully.  
This was not the case in Vietnam. The GVN failed to take into account 
anthropological factors in the execution of its Strategic Hamlet program. Military 
efforts were not coordinated nor in compliance with the government’s overall 
strategy. The military was allowed to exercise authority on its own, and as a 
result the importance of cultural and religious matters was discounted. The new 
structures introduced by government officials destroyed traditional cultures and 
norms.80 The government not only lost support, but also faced resistance, with 
fatal consequences. 
Of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of 
insurgencies, none is more important than the nature of the government 
response. Professor Walter Sonderlund puts this succinctly: ‘As soon as the 
challenge is in the open the success of the operation depends not primarily on 
the development of the insurgent strength, but more importantly on the degree of 
vigor, determination and skill with which the incumbent regime acts to defend 
itself, both politically and militarily.’81 
 
B. THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 
Based on the author’s personal experiences, this thesis began with the 
hypothesis that the success of both Malaysian Emergencies was due to the 
government’s understanding of the importance of anthropological factors for its 
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counterinsurgency strategy. In support of this, the author also hypothesized that 
stringent internal laws and a good relationship with Thailand (a neighboring state) 
to stop external support were necessary to strengthen the execution of 
Malaysia’s counterinsurgency strategy. 
Many in the past have studied the success of the 1st Malayan Emergency, 
but none have paid attention to the application of this model during the 2nd 
Emergency. It is during this period that anthropologically informed strategy really 
crystallized. At this point the Malaysian government acknowledged that the 
communist insurgents could only be eliminated when the cause of the conflict 
was eliminated. In the Malaysian case, the real fuel was racial conflict between 
the Malays and the immigrant communities. The other factors were all used and 
exploited by various groups to gain support and to justify their position.  Hence, 
the Malaysians enhanced the anthropology- like approach taken by the British 
into a strategy called KESBAN. The implementation of KESBAN was in line with 
the government’s aim of reducing racial antagonism, religious extremism, and 
bringing more balance to socio-economic conditions.  
There seems to be sufficient evidence, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, to support this hypothesis.  Nevertheless, can this model be applied to 
other places or elsewhere in dealing with terrorism?  The author is optimistic that 
the model is applicable elsewhere and applicable in a limited scope to counter 
terrorism. However, the model only provides a broad brush approach and there 
must not be an attempt to apply it as a template in its totality because the 
environment, the people, and the cause of the conflict are always likely to differ 
from what was experienced in Malaysia.  
In Vietnam, for example, Thompson’s plan was not applied by the 
government to fit the Vietnamese situation, but rather what worked in Malaya 
was simply borrowed, almost wholesale. What is important are the various 
concepts in the model, more than the exact model. There must be flexibility when 
it comes to the details. The flexibility in most cases depends on the 
anthropological factors that are involved. 
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The principles Thompson developed, plus the KESBAN strategy, which 
requires a complete study of various anthropological factors, taken together can 
provide the tools essential for combating insurgency or terrorism. The strategy 
must be comprehensive, and include the military, police, and civil development 
programs under the overall command of a specific council that has the authority 
to make budgetary and operational decisions. Time and again, Malaysia has 
proven that this approach is feasible. Incidents such as the crackdown on 
religious extremists like Al-Maunah82 in 2000 and Jemaah Islamiah (JI)/ 
Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM)83 in 2002 by the Malaysian Government 
support the notion that such an interagency counterinsurgency strategy is 
applicable on a limited scale to counter terrorism.  
 
C. PROPOSAL 
Enhancing security capabilities goes beyond merely increasing firepower. 
It includes measures to identify the causes and the surrounding factors that will 
not only ensure winning the battles but also ensuring victory in war. Enhancing 
security capabilities is especially compelling in cases of counterinsurgency and 
counter-terrorism. The roots of success for this kind of operation invariably lie in 
the support of the population. Security and development coordination together, 
as initiated by Malaysia and encapsulated in the KESBAN concept, are certainly 
worthy of further study.  
What KESBAN did was adopt strategies and tactics adjusted to suit local 
cultural practices and thereby pragmatically won popular support. What very few 
people seem to realize is that the KESBAN concept was not simply a model for 
economic and social change. Given its realistic appreciation for ethnocentric 
biases, it also took into account the geo-political interests of economically 
dominant nations and it indirect approach that focused on counterinsurgency. 
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The British and the Malaysian experiences during the Emergencies have not 
been properly assimilated nor has the knowledge gained been adapted to the 
threats of today.  
Looking at the lessons that could be learned from the 2nd, and not just the 
1st Malaysian Emergency, it is the author’s view that there is no reason why a 
similar approach should not be adopted in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere where 
a template surely won’t work, but where the combination of Thompson’s 
principles and consideration of local anthropological factors can yield a specific 
set of tools to be applied. In most of the present day conflict there is a need for a 
grand strategy that is able to weaken the terrorist threat as well as strengthen the 
people’s support to the government. The blend of civil and military action into one 
strategy as applied in Malaysia seeks to undermine and defeat terrorists. 
Similarity in objective and approach makes the author confident that the model 
discussed in this thesis is suitable to be considered. The present-day situation 
has shown that the pattern of war has changed. There are relatively few 
conventional wars, but a considerable number of guerrilla wars and new 
development of terrorist-type actions. This thesis proposes a model that could be 
an option or a tool in the search for a successful strategy for future 
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